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THE COLD WAR AND THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT

OF DISPUTES: A COMMENT
DAVID M. COHEN*
After examining the legal issue raised by both sides prior to the American Civil War, Professor Katz concludes that although both the Union
and the Southern states phrased their arguments in legal terms and
recognized that a procedure existed whereby the issue could have been
submitted to the Supreme Court, a judgment rendered by the Court (assuming the Court determined the issue to be justiciable), "... would not
have altered the event. The United States and the Confederacy would
have gone to war."' This conclusion indicates that at least one (and,
perhaps, two) of the optimum conditions for submission of the secession
issue to adjudication and for compliance with a determination thereof
was not present.
If, according to Professor Katz, the parties to a dispute believe that
.. it is more important to sustain institutions for an orderly and expeditious disposition of

. .

. disputes than to arrive at this or that out-

come in the particular dispute, ' 2 it certainly is likely that one of the
parties will comply with a judicial decision which it views as adverse. It
appears clear that the decision to submit a dispute to adjudication can
be influenced by the probability that at least one of the parties will not
comply with an adverse decision, i.e., that the optimum condition for
compliance noted above is absent. Thus, Lincoln may have believed that
submission to the Supreme Court of the dispute between the Union and
the South would have been a futile act. He certainly had cause to believe that the Southern states had decided that withdrawal from the
Union was more desirable than the abolition of slavery. Therefore, Lincoln may have concluded that even if the Supreme Court were to decide
that withdrawal from the Union was illegal, the South would not comply
with the decision. Submission of the dispute to the Supreme Court would,
therefore, have been futile.
However, it would appear that Lincoln's failure to submit the issue to
the Supreme Court may have involved more than the belief that the act
would have been futile. As Professor Katz notes, if the dispute had been
decided by the Supreme Court, "the judgment might not have been
wholly without effect. One combatant might have been morally supported
and the other morally hampered 'in the opinion of mankind,' to whatever degree and in whatever direction the judgment might have affected
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law.

1. Katz, The Cold War and the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes: The Relevance of
International Adjudication, 6 DUQUESNE L. REV. 95, 111 (1968).
2. Id. at 110.
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'the opinion of mankind.' "I Most likely Lincoln desired as much support for his position as he could garner. Furthermore, Lincoln surely
would have gained some support if his position were buttressed by an
opinion, on the merits or by default, of the Supreme Court. Consequently, to answer the question as to why Lincoln failed to submit the
question to judicial determination, the absence of other "optimum" conditions must be posited.
Professor Katz notes that a number of factors may affect the ability
of the parties to a dispute to predict the result of submission of their
dispute to adjudication. 4 The fact that the result of a submission to
adjudication may not be predictable within tolerable limits may also influence the decision of the parties to submit a dispute to adjudication.
Thus, if Lincoln was uncertain as to whether or not a decision of the
Supreme Court would be in favor of the position of the Union, he might
have been reluctant to submit the issue to adjudication. His reluctance
becomes more evident, if it is assumed, as seems probable, that Lincoln
believed that it would not have been desirable for the Union to comply
with a decision adverse to its position.' Under these circumstances, the
accomplishment of Lincoln's goal, the preservation of the Union, would
have been made more difficult by a Supreme Court decision adverse to
the Union. If the issue had been submitted to the Supreme Court and if
the Supreme Court had decided the issue in favor of the position of the
South, Lincoln would have been forced to refuse to comply with a judicial
decision confirming the legality of the decision of the South to withdraw
from the Union. Lincoln's attempt to change the decision of the South by
force would then have assumed the appearance of a war for territorial
aggrandizement rather than the appearance of an attempt to suppress an
internal rebellion and to restore the status quo. Lincoln might have concluded that nothing (except moral force) very much could be gained by
a submission of the dispute to the Supreme Court (since presumably the
South would not comply with an adverse decision) while much could be
lost if the decision were adverse to the position of the Union. He, therefore, might well have concluded that, on balance, there was more to be
gained by leaving the issue vague and not definitively resolved.
Thus far, the discussion has centered about the situation in which a
dispute is not submitted to judicial determination due to the fact, inter
3. Id. at 111-12.
. the principles and
4. E.g., "The optimum conditions are presented when . .
standards are precise and definite. .. ." Id. at 110. Professor Katz also notes that ". . . (adjudication is more difficult] for an established tribunal applying accepted criteria, if the
criteria are broad and vague." Id. at 110-11. It would appear that this last principle also
creates difficulties for a party attempting to decide whether or not to submit a dispute
to adjudication.
5. Id. at 108-09.
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alia, that the strength of the desire of one or both parties to achieve a
given result is perceived as greater than the strength of the desire to
preserve a given system of cooperation. In these circumstances, one party
(or both parties) is reluctant to submit the dispute to adjudication because it is believed that little would be gained by a decision adverse to
the other party (since the other party would not comply with an adverse
decision) while moral force could be lost by a decision adverse to the
party submitting the dispute (since, presumably, he also would refuse to
comply with an adverse decision). However, the strength of the desire
to achieve a given result as compared with the strength of the desire to
preserve a given system of cooperation can influence the decision to submit a dispute to adjudication in another manner.
If one party to a dispute desires to retain a given system of cooperation and is uncertain about the strength of the same desire in the other
party, the former may refuse to submit the issue to adjudication for
fear that the very submission of the dispute to a tribunal may cause
the latter to finally decide not to preserve the system of cooperation.
To take a simple example from the domestic arena, suppose Smith and
his wife are each considering the possibility of divorce. If Smith files a
suit for divorce in the appropriate court, his action may have at least
two possible effects upon his wife. The filing of the suit may cause
Smith's wife either to attempt one last effort at reconciliation or to finally
decide that no attempt at reconciliation is possible and that divorce is the
proper course of action. If, before filing suit, Smith was undecided as to
whether divorce is the proper course of action, or if he had, in fact, decided that he did not want a divorce, Smith must at least consider the
contingency that a possible effect of his decision to file for divorce may
be to convince his wife that no reconciliation is possible and that divorce
is in fact the proper course of action.6
To illustrate the application of this proposition in the international
arena, it may be helpful to take as an example the crisis which occurred
in the European Economic Community or Common Market in 1965.
One of the purposes underlying the establishment of the European
Economic Community was the belief that the integration of the economies of the member states would "spill over" 7 into political integration.
6. Of course, if Smith has finally decided upon divorce, he need not be concerned
about the effect upon his wife of filing a suit. If the filing of the suit leads his wife to
attempt reconciliation, Smith may simply rebuff her and proceed with the divorce.
7. The term "spill-over" has been utilized to refer to the situation where, for example,
the integration of one sector of the economy leads ". . . inevitably . . . to the integration
of other economic and political activities." LnsmiBER, THE POLITICAL DYNAMICS oF EURoPEAN EcoNomc INTEGRATION 10 (1963).
For a conclusion that "spill-over" is not an "iron law" when applied to the European
Economic Community see CAws'S, EuRoPA" UNIxICATION IN THE SIXTmS 211 (Paperback
ed. 1966).

DUQUESNE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6:117

Thus, although the stated goal of the Common Market was the elimination of barriers to economic activity, e.g., the removal of tariffs and
quantitative restrictions between member states and the establishment
of a common tariff applicable to goods imported from non-member
states, the fundamental motivation was political.'
Charles de Gaulle does not agree with the political motivation of the
Common Market. According to de Gaulle, only the nation-state is capable of playing an active role in the outside world and, in his view,
"supranational" bodies are not and cannot be states.9 Consequently, de
Gaulle is of the opinion that there is great danger in the expansion of the
powers of the institution of the European Coal and Steel Community,
the European Atomic Energy Community, and the European Economic
Community. In his view,
while the Communities, with their unreal power and fragmented
competence, could never be an effective government for Europe,
they could succeed in robbing the old national states of their
faculties and thus there would be no institutions left in Europe
capable of performing the role of a State. If successful, they
would leave Europe in a political vacuum which others with
hegemonic predilictions would be only too eager to fill. For de
Gaulle, a federal Europe means an American Europe.' 0
The 1965 crisis arose out of a conflict between those who desired to
strengthen the institutions of the Community as a means of furthering
the movement towards increased political unification and the views of
Charles de Gaulle." The Commission 12 prepared a proposal
8. LINDBERG, supra note 7 at 4.
9. CALLEO, EUROPE'S FU umx 86 (1965).
10. Id. at 86-7.
11. The issues involved in the 1965 crisis were extremely complex. The dispute set forth
in the text represents a greatly simplified version. For a full treatment of the 1965 crisis see
generally, CAMPS, supra note 7.
12. Article 4 of the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, CCH
COMMON MKT. REP. ff 175, provides for the creation of a Council (composed of representafives of the member states, CCH CoMMON MKT. REP.
4405), an Assembly (composed of
delegates appointed by the legislative bodies of the member states from among their members, CCH CoMMoN MET. REP. 1 4305), a Commission (composed of individuals chosen
for their competence and independence, CCH CoMMON MET. REP.
157), and a Court of
Justice (composed of seven judges each of whom . . . fulfils the conditions required for the
holding of the highest judicial office in their respective countries or who are jurists of
recognized and outstanding competence. . . . , CCH CoMMeoN MET. REP.
4611). See
generally, Stein, The New Institutions in STEIN & NIcHoLSON, 1 A pRIcAN ENTERPRISE IN
THE EUiROPEA N COMoIq MARKET: A LEGAL PROFILE 33 (1960).

Pursuant to the Convention Relating to Certain Institutions Common to the European
Communities, CCH COMMON MXT. REP.
5100, the Assembly and the Court of Justice
serve the European Coal and Steel Community, and the European Atomic Energy Community as well as the European Economic Community. Similarly, pursuant to the Treaty
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which would have linked in a single "package" an agreement
(a) on financing the common agricultural policy (in which
France was greatly interested), (b) on diversion to the Community treasury of customs proceeds from third-country imports of agricultural and industrial products . . . and (c) on

increasing the budgetary powers of the European Parliament ....

13

The intent of the Commission was clear; it hoped to obtain France's
agreement to an expansion of the powers of the Community institutions
in return for an agreement on a policy in which France was greatly
interested.
The Commission failed. On June 30, 1965, the French Government
embarked upon the so-called "empty-chair" policy. French governmental
representatives were withdrawn from the Councils and the Sessions of
the Permanent Representatives. The French representatives also refused
to participate in any meeting called for the purpose of elaborating new
policies or laws. The only activities in which the French would participate were technical meetings called to administer previously agreed upon
policies. 4
One of the legal issues presented by the French policy involved the
question of the effect of the French absence. The Treaty Establishing
the European Economic Community contains a number of provisions
which require that any action taken by the Council pursuant to these
provisions be adopted by a unanimous vote.' 5 Did the provisions for a
unanimous vote require affirmative action on the part of the members
of the Council, i.e., would an abstention by one of the members result
in a failure to fulfil the requirement of unanimity? If an abstention would
not violate the requirement of a unanimous vote, could France's absence
be considered to be an abstention?
The Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community provides for the creation of a Court of Justice.' A determination of whether
this court possessed jurisdiction of these legal issues requires a brief
description of the jurisdictional powers conferred upon the Court by the
Treaty.
The jurisdictional powers of the Court of Justice can be categorized
in a number of different ways. For example, certain jurisdictional powers
Establishing a Single Council and a Single Commission of the European Communities, CCH
COMMON MKT. REP. 115116-52, the Council and the Commission serve all three communities.
13. STEIN and HAY, LAW AND INSTITUTIONS IN THE ATLANTIC AREA 106 (1967).
14. Id.
15. E.g., Article 28, CCH COMMON MARKET REP. ff 305.
16. See note 12 s-upra.
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possessed by the Court can be analogized to the powers possessed by a
"constitutional" court, while others can be compared to those possessed
by an "administrative" tribunal or agency. 7 In addition, pursuant to
articles 169"s and 17019 of the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, the Court can be 20said to possess the jurisdictional
powers of an "international" tribunal.
Pursuant to article 169,21 the "executive" body of the Community,
the Commission, may issue an opinion 22 to the effect that a member state
has failed to fulfil any of the obligations imposed upon it by the Treaty.
If the member state to which the opinion is addressed fails to comply
with the terms of the opinion within the period of time specified by the
Commission, the latter may submit the matter to the Court of Justice.
Article 17023 contains a procedure whereby one member state may obtain a judgment of the Court of Justice to the effect that another member
state has failed to comply with any obligation imposed upon it by the
Treaty. Prior to submission of the dispute to the Court of Justice, the
complainant member state must request the Commission to render a reasoned opinion on the matter. The Commission must give the allegedly
delinquent member state an opportunity to ". . . submit its own case and
' 24 If
to reply to the other State's case . . . both orally and in writing.

the allegedly delinquent state fails to comply with the terms of the
17. See HAY, FEDERALISM AND SUPRANATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 106 (1966). See also,
STEN, supra note 12 at 70.
18. CCH COMMON MKT. REP. 4615.
19. CCH COMMON MKT. REP. ff 4621.
20. Article 182, CCH COMMON MXT. REP. 4681, provides:
The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to decide any dispute between Member
States in connection with the objects of this Treaty, where such dispute is submitted to it under the terms of a special agreement.
The jurisdictional power conferred upon the Court by this article has also been characterized
as "international." See Hay, supra note 17 at n.15.
Due to the fact that article 182 requires a special agreement and to the fact that it is
assumed, for the purposes of this paper that France would not have agreed to submit the
disputes involved in the 1965 crisis to the Court, a discussion of article 182 is omitted.
21. CCH COMM ON MKT. REP. 4615.
22. The acts of the Council or the Commission may take the form of "regulations,"
"directives," "decisions," "recommendations," or "opinions." Article 189, CCH COMMON
MKT. REP. ff 4901, defines these terms:
Regulations shall have general application. They shall be binding in every
respect and directly applicable in each Member State.
Directives shall be binding upon every Member State to which they are addressed as to the result to be achieved, but the form and means of enforcing
them shall be left to the national authorities.
Decisions shall be binding in every respect for the addresses named therein.
Recommendations and opinions shall have binding force.
23. CCH CoMMON MKT. REP. 9 4621.
24. Id.
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opinion, the Commission may then institute proceedings under article
169.25 If the Commission fails to render an opinion 26 within three
months after the matter was referred to it, the complainant member
state may itself submit the matter to the Court of Justice.
From this rather brief survey of what may be termed the "international" jurisdiction of the Court of Justice, it is at least arguable that a
procedure did exist whereby the legal issue presented by the 1965 crisis
could have been presented to the Court of Justice. For example, article
5 of the Treaty provides:
[Member States] . . . shall abstain from any measures which

could jeopardize the attainment of the objectives of this
Treaty.2"
The procedures of article 169 or 170 could have been utilized to institute
an action against France on the basis that the "empty-chair" policy
violated article 5. However, as there was no agreement on the legal issue
of whether such a suit was possible, 8 it may be desirable to determine
whether there were any other methods whereby the legal issue could
have been submitted to the Court.
The Council and the Commission are authorized by articles 189 to
adopt regulations, directives, and decisions in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Treaty. 2 The five member states, acting as the
Council, could have adopted, in the absence of France, a regulation,
directive, or decision which, pursuant to the Treaty, could be adopted
only by a unanimous vote. France would then either (1) institute a suit
for annulment in the Court of Justice on the basis that the regulation
had been adopted in violation of basic procedural rules"0 ; or, (2) assum25. See BEaR, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 158-59 (1962).
26. Professor Bebr states that a member state may refer the matter to the Court only
if the Commission issues no opinion within a three months' period. Id. at 159.
27. CCH COMMON MET. REP. ff 181.
28. See CAMS, supra note 7 at 79.
29. See note 22 supra.
30. Article 173, CCH CoMMON MET. RaP. ff 4635, confers jurisdiction upon the Court
to ". . . review the lawfulness of acts other than recommendations or opinions of the
Council and the Commission." An appeal to review the lawfulness of an act may be
instituted
S.. by a Member State, the Council or the Commission on the grounds of lack of
jurisdiction, violation of basic procedural rules, infringement of this Treaty or of
any legal provision relating to its implementation, or of abuse of power.
In addition,
any natural or legal person may, under the same conditions, appeal against a decision which, although in the form of a regulation or a decision addressed to
another person, is of direct and individual concern to him.
See generally, BEBR, supra note 25; Stein and Hay, New Legal Remedies of Enterprises:
A Survey, in 1 AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARxET: A LEGAL PROFILE
459 (Stein and Nicholson ed. 1960).
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ing the regulation required France to take some affirmative action, comply with the regulation. If France refused to comply, the Commission or
one of the other member states could then invoke the procedures of
article 169 or 170. Thus, the legal issue would have been determined
either implicitly upon the compliance of France with the regulation
(thereby acknowledging the validity thereof) or explicitly by the Court
of Justice on the basis of a suit by either France, or the Commission, or
one of the five remaining member states.
The legal issue presented by the dispute could have reached the Court
in yet a third manner either in addition to or instead of the two methods
already noted.
If the member states, acting in their capacity as members of the
Council, had adopted, in the absence of France, a decision which, pursuant to the Treaty, required an unanimous vote, a private party to
whom the decision was addressed could have attacked the decision before
the Community Court in a suit for annulment on the basis that the decision had been adopted in ".

.

. violation of basic procedural rules ....

,3l

Similarly, the member states, acting in their capacity as members of the
Council, could have adopted a regulation which, pursuant to the Treaty,
required an unanimous vote. A private party affected by the regulation
could then refuse to comply with its terms. If a decision were then addressed to the private party directing compliance with the regulation,
the addressee could have instituted a suit for annulment of the decision
on the basis that the regulation upon which the decision was premised
was "inapplicable" due to the fact that the regulation had been adopted
in "... violation of basic procedural rules .... ,,"2 A suit of either type,
instituted by a private party, would have presented the Court with the
issue of whether France's refusal to participate in Community activities
prevented the Community from acting.
Assuming that the issue had been presented to the Court, would the
Court have decided the issue? It would appear that the Court has utilized
the procedural rules governing the standing of a party to institute a
suit before the Court as a means of developing at least the "seeds" of a
31. See note 30 supra.
32. Article 184 of the Treaty, CCH COMMON MKT. REP. IT4691, provides:
where a regulation of the Council or of the Commission is the subject of legal
proceedings, any of the parties concerned may . . . invoke the grounds set out in
article 173, first paragraph [see note 30 supra] in order to allege before the Court
of Justice that the regulation concerned is inapplicable.
Article 184 may be invoked only in the course of legal proceedings based upon other
provisions of the Treaty, e.g., when a natural or legal person is properly attacking a decision
addressed to the plaintiff, a decision addressed to another which is of direct and specific
concern to the plaintiff, or a decision in the form of a regulation pursuant to article 173.
Milchwerke Heinz Wihrman & Sohn KG v. EEC Commission, 8 Recueil 965 (1963); 1963
C.M.L. Rep. 152 (Joint Cases 31 & 33/62).
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doctrine of "political" questions.3 In the circumstances of the crisis of
1965, however, the issues could have been raised by so many parties in
so many different ways that, while the Court might have been able to
delay a decision of the issue, it is difficult to see how the Court could
have avoided a decision altogether.
Assuming a suit had been instituted and assuming the Court could not
avoid a decision, how would the issue have been decided? Legal opinion
at the time was apparently divided (at least during the early stages of
the crisis). 3 4 However, it does appear that "many, but not all, of the
Community lawyers were prepared to defend the thesis that the Community must be able to exercise their full powers and that, accordingly,
the Five could legally take decisions requiring an unanimous vote as
well as decisions requiring majority votes.

'3'

Thus, although it is far

from clear, it is arguable that the Court would have agreed with many
of the Community lawyers and would have decided that France's absence
did not prevent the Council from taking action otherwise requiring
unanimity.
However, during the "crisis" of 1965, the member states refrained
from taking any action which would have had the result of submitting
the legal issue involved to the Court of Justice. In fact, the Community
did not take any action (other than action on technical matters) even
where action was unlikely to raise a legal problem. 6 The Community
thus remained paralyzed for seven months until an agreement was
reached which ended the crisis."7
Why did the member states refrain from taking any action which might
have resulted in a judicial determination of the legal issues raised by
the dispute? Of course, no definitive answer can be given. However, it
is possible to indicate some of the factors which might have influenced
the decision not to submit the matter to a judicial determination.
It seems clear that the Five38 desired to continue participation in the
formation of a common market at least as long as France continued to
participate.3 9 In fact, the desire of the members in this respect may have
been so strong that they were willing to accede to at least some of the
French demands concerning the nature of the Common Market should
33. SHEINGOLD, THE RuLE or LAW IN EUROPAN INTEGRATION 282-3

(1965).

34. CAmPS, supra note 7 at 77.
35. Id. at 101 n.18.

36. Id. at 73-4.
37. The agreement and accompanying statement are reproduced in STEIN AND HAY,
supra note 13 at 110-3.
38. The member states other than France, i.e., Italy, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg, are hereinafter referred to as "the Five."
39. This fact is indicated by the fact that an agreement was reached which did accede
to some of the French demands. See the agreement cited in note 37 supra.
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this prove necessary to induce France to continue to participate. In
these circumstances, the members may have wished to avoid appearing
unwilling to accede to any of the French demands. Thus, at least for
some time, the Five might hesitate to take any action which might
force the submission of the legal issues to judicial determination for
fear that the submission of the issue for determination would indicate
to France that no accommodation was possible and thereby force France
to decide to discontinue participation in the system of cooperation.
It is true that the submission of an issue to a tribunal can and has,
in some instances, forced the recalcitrant party to attempt to reach a
compromise, especially when there is a good possibility that, should the
dispute be submitted to adjudication, the decision will be adverse to the
party resisting compromise. 40 However, submission of a dispute to
adjudication will operate in this manner only if some degree of desire to
continue cooperation on the part of the recalcitrant can be assumed. In
the circumstances of the 1965 crisis, the Five were perhaps unsure of
the strength of the desire of France to continue as a member of the
European Economic Community. 41 They therefore wished to avoid any
action which would cause France to make a precipitous decision, or, if
France had already, decided not to continue participation, which would
give France an opportunity to place the onus for the dissolution of the
Community upon the Five. Thus, ".

.

. the Five and the Commission

were at pains to keep open all lines of approach to the French, to avoid
anything that could be interpreted as provocation or ganging up, and to
make it as easy as possible for the French to return to the negotiating
2
table."4
Of course, the refusal of the Five to move towards a final determination of the issue could not, in the circumstances of the 1965 crisis, continue indefinitely. The desire of the Five to avoid provoking the French
led to a complete paralysis of the Community. At some point, the
Five would have decided that a determination of the issue was more
desirable than the continuance of the status quo. At this point, after they
40. See SHEINOOLD, supra note 33 at 306-7.
41. The truth of this assumption may be in doubt due to the fact that France did
continue to cooperate to some extent during the crisis. For example, the French did make
the internal tariff cut required by the various acceleration decisions (and not the Treaty) by
January 1, 1966. CAmps, supra note 7 at 103. However, the fact that France did make the
required cut did not mean that France was not considering a decision to discontinue
participation. For example, the fact that the French had made the cut,
as a sign of goodwill was . . . offset to some extent by the last-minute refusal
[of France] to agree to the Community budget by the written procedure [adopted
during the crisis], despite the fact that the Five had deliberately scaled down
their proposals to make them acceptable to the French. CAmPs, supra note 7 at
103-4.
42. Id. at 73-4.
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had reached the opinion that enough opportunity for compromise had
been given to France, they may have moved towards presenting the issue
for determination. In fact, as January 1, 1966 (the date upon which a
substantial number of matters became eligible for majority vote) approached, ".

.

. signs .

.

. [began to multiply] that if .

.

. [the French]

continued to boycott the Brussels meetings the Five would shortly begin
taking decisions on their own. ''4 , This fact-plus the fact that ". . . the
Five had made no secret of the fact that they were thinking of approaching the British if the French continued their boycott"" presumably led
the French government to decide that there were fewer risks in returning to the Community than in continuing to refuse to participate.4 5 The
crisis was then resolved.
Although it is not entirely clear, it would appear that the decision not
to submit the legal issues involved in the 1965 crisis to adjudication was
premised upon the existence of factors similar to those present in the
decision not to submit the dispute between the North and South in the
Civil War period to the Supreme Court. Both decisions involved, to some
extent, an estimate of the strength of the desire to achieve a particular
result as compared to the strength of the desire to preserve institutions
of cooperation. In the circumstances of the Civil War, however, at least
one, if not both sides, had decided, prior to the consideration of a decision to submit the dispute to judicial determination, not to comply with
an adverse decision. At least one party, and perhaps both, presumably
decided not to refer the question to the Supreme Court because, while
some moral force would be gained by a decision adverse to the other
party (no compulsive result was foreseen since the loser would not,
in all probability, comply), some moral force might be lost (due to the
fact that if an adverse decision was rendered against the party submitting the dispute, that party would not comply either).
While the decision not to submit the legal issues to judicial determination in the 1965 crisis was also based in part upon an estimate of the
relative strengths of the desire of the parties to achieve a particular
result as compared to the desire to preserve a system of cooperation, the
estimate of the relative strengths of the desires played a different role.
Here, at least one of the parties, the Five, desired to continue cooperation but was uncertain as to the strength of the French desire to continue to participate. In this situation, therefore, the Five appeared to
base their decision not to submit the issues to adjudication, in part at
least, upon the fear that the mere submission of the dispute and/or the
favorable resolution of the dispute by the Court would have had the
43. Id. at 122.
44. Id. at 122-3.

45. Id.
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effect of forcing France to finally decide not to continue participation in
the joint effort to create a common market.
It may be noted that an estimate of the strength of the desire to
achieve a particular result as compared with the strength of the desire to
continue cooperation can perform a function in many Cold War disputes.
For example, assume the United States is involved in a dispute with the
Soviet Union and is considering whether or not to submit the dispute to
adjudication. For the purpose of making the decision, the policy-makers
within the United States could decide that the Soviet Union would be
willing to agree to submit the dispute to adjudication. What factors
might the American policy-makers take into account in making their
decision?
One factor which the American policy-makers might take into account
is their answer to the question of whether the Soviet Union would be
willing to adhere to a judgment adverse to its position. If the estimate
of the United States is that the Soviet Union would not adhere, the
United States might consider submitting the issue to judicial determination in any event due to the fact that some moral force would be gained,
even if the Soviets refused to adhere to the judgment (or even if the
Soviets publicly refused to submit the dispute to judicial determination).
If the legal position of the United States is not strong relative to an
estimate of the strength of the position of the Soviet Union or if it is
uncertain which legal rules apply to the dispute and/or if the legal rules
are unclear, the United States must consider the possibility that the determination could be adverse to its position. Thus, the United States
must also take into consideration the question of whether the United States
would adhere to an adverse judgment. If the United States would not adhere to an adverse judgment and the estimate concerning the possibilities
of a decision favorable to the American position is that the decision is, to
an unacceptable degree, likely to be in favor of the Soviet Union, the
United States may refuse to submit the dispute to adjudication due to
the risk of the loss of moral force should the decision be adverse to the
United States and the United States refuses to comply.
Thus far, the role of the estimate of the strength of the desire to
achieve a particular result relative to the strength of the desire to preserve some system of cooperation has been similar to the discussion of
the operation of the same estimate in the American Civil War. The estimate may also function, in addition, in a manner similar to the function
it performed in the Common Market crisis of 1965, given the desire of
the United States to continue cooperation with the Soviet Union.
In reaching a decision on the question of whether to submit the decision to adjudication, the United States might take into account an
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estimate of the effect of a submission to adjudication upon the Soviet
Union. The Soviet Union might view the submission as indicative of
American intractability. If the effect upon the Soviet Union were of
this nature, the submission of the issue to adjudication may affect the
Soviet perception of the strength of the American desire to cooperate
with the Soviet Union on this and, perhaps, on future problems as wella result which the United States would view as undesirable given the
desire of the United States to reach an accommodation with the Soviet
Union and to increase Soviet-American cooperation. Thus, the United
States may reach a decision not to submit the dispute to adjudication,
in part at least, upon a basis which is similar to the basis upon which,
in part at least, the Five reached a decision not to submit their dispute
with France to adjudication during the Common Market crisis of 1965.
The foregoing discussion has focused on some of the possible functions of one or two of the "optimum" conditions for adjudication and
compliance noted by Professor Katz. A discussion of the manner in
which these same principles may function in other situations and a discussion of other "optimum" conditions, e.g., the limitations upon adjudication imposed by the nature of the adjudicatory process, are beyond
the scope of these remarks. Nevertheless, I must agree with Professor
Katz that, at least until the trust between the United States and the
Soviet Union has developed to the point where the submission of a dispute to adjudication is not viewed as an indication of the lack of a desire to cooperate, ".

.

. in international Cold War disputes, the condi-

tions for adjudication at best lie at the far edge of the spectrum [;]
typically, they lie beyond the limits."46
46. KATZ, supra note 1 at 114.

